CT Municipality Liable for Benefits Owed to Employee of Uninsured Roofing Subcontractor
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in a split decision, held that, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-291, the city of Bridgeport was the “principal employer” of an employee of an uninsured roofing subcontractor who sustained injuries while repairing the roof on one of the city’s facilities [Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic, 2020 Conn. LEXIS 190 (Aug. 13, 2020)]. Specifically, the city was in the “trade or business” of maintaining and repairing municipal buildings and facilities and, therefore, was liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits of an injured roofer because the city chose not to employ roofers of its own.
Background
In March 2000, the city of Bridgeport hired All Roofs by Dominic (“All Roofs”) to do repair work on the roof of one of the city’s facilities. In turn, All Roofs hired Howard Adams d/b/a Howie’s Roofing (Howie’s Roofing) as a subcontractor. On June 29, 2000, the plaintiff, an employee of Howie’s Roofing, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when he fell from the roof under repair. After his fall, the plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits from Howie’s Roofing, All Roofs, and the city. Neither Howie’s Roofing nor All Roofs carried a valid workers’ compensation insurance policy.
City’s “Trade or Business”
A Workers’ Compensation Commissioner determined that because Howie’s Roofing was uninsured, the state’s Secondary Injury Fund (“the fund”) was required to pay the workers’ compensation benefits owed to the plaintiff pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-355. The fund subsequently contested liability on the ground that, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-291, the city was the principal employer of the plaintiff and, therefore, was required to pay the workers’ compensation benefits owed to him. The city denied that the roofing work performed by All Roofs was a part or process in the city’s “trade or business,” which is a prerequisite to establish principal employer liability under § 31-291.
Relevant Procedural Aspects of Case
The commissioner ruled that, under Massolini v. Driscoll, 114 Conn. 546, 551-52, 159 A. 480 (1932), a municipality could be liable as a principal employer under § 31-291. The commissioner also determined that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-148, the city had a statutory duty to manage, maintain, repair, and control its property, including the facility where the plaintiff sustained his injuries. In addition, the commissioner concluded that the work of repairing the roof of the transfer facility was a part or process in the city’s trade or business. Accordingly, the commissioner found that the city was the plaintiff’s principal employer and ordered the defendants to pay the workers’ compensation benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled. Ultimately, the board affirmed the commissioner’s decision, as did the state’s appellate court [see Barker v. All Roofs by Dominic, 183 Conn. App. 612, 623, 193 A.3d 693 (2018). The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal.
Arguments on Appeal
The defendants contended in relevant part that roof repair was not a part or process in the city’s trade or business under § 31-291, as construed by Massolini. Alternatively, the defendants argued that Massolini was no longer good law because (1) it utilized an outdated definition of “business” under the principal employer statute, and (2) the subsequent creation of the fund had “displaced” Massolini by providing a “logical alternative” to the holding in that case.
The Massolini Decision
The majority of the high court noted that in Massolini, the city of Hartford hired a contractor to provide a team of horses and a driver to collect ashes and rubbish left out by the public for removal. The driver employed by the contractor was fatally injured while tending to the horses’ shoes, precipitating a workers’ compensation claim. The Supreme Court determined that the removal of ashes and rubbish was part of the city of Hartford’s police powers and held that such work was a “business” of the city within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The high court concluded that because the driver’s work on the horses’ shoes was incidental to and in furtherance of the operations involved in the business of Hartford, a valid claim for compensation was established.
Supreme Court’s Conclusion
The majority of the Supreme Court found that the commissioner reasonably determined that maintenance of the facility where the plaintiff sustained injuries, including the repair of the facility’s roof, was among “the usual affairs of the corporation, and such as commonly engage the attention of its officers” and, therefore, was a part or process in the city’s business. The majority added that in the present case, the city’s business included, among other things, the maintenance and repair of its buildings and facilities. The majority carefully added, however, that it was not saying that all such repairs, regardless of their complexity and the level of specialization required, were automatically considered to be part of the business of a large municipality such as Bridgeport.
The majority declined to overrule Massolini, indicating the Workers’ Compensation Act included municipalities within the definition of employer [see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-275 (10)]; and the term “principal employer” had been construed to encompass municipalities for more than eighty years. The majority added that the holding and implications of Massolini and its progeny had become embedded as part of the state’s workers’ compensation law, and the majority was unwilling to overturn established doctrine and upset settled expectations under these circumstances.
Dissent
Chief Justice Robinson, joined by justices Kahn and Elgo, dissented. The Chief Justice indicated in relevant part that although he agreed with the majority that the city’s statutory authorization to engage in the construction and maintenance of municipal buildings was a relevant factor in determining whether roofing was a part or process in its business, the sheer breadth of municipal powers under § 7-148 (c), which encompasses nearly every conceivable aspect of running a city, meant that excessive reliance on that factor would render a municipality the workers’ compensation guarantor of virtually every employee of an independent contractor engaged by the city.