Florida First Responder’s PTSD Claim is Untimely Filed

A Florida appellate court held the 52-week filing requirement found in § 112.1815(5)(d), Fla. Stat., operated as a statute of repose, and not as a statute of limitations. Under the statute, the 52-week filing requirement begins to run on the date of the qualifying event, not the date of the manifestation of PTSD symptoms. Accordingly, where a first responder witnessed a drowning in 2015, experienced some problems with distractedness, anxiety, and depression soon thereafter, but did not actually manifest PTSD until 2019, his August 5, 2019 petition for benefits was untimely and it was error for a Judge of Compensation Claims to award benefits on the claim [Palm Beach Cty. Fire Rescue v. Wilkes, 2020 Fla. App. LEXIS 17726 (1st DCA, Dec. 14, 2020)].

Background

In 2015, Claimant, who worked as a first responder, witnessed the rescue of a young boy who drowned. Claimant continued to work over the next few years, but experienced problems with distractedness, anxiety, and depression. In April or May of 2019, he went underwater diving with friends. Sometime afterward, he had a dream that the drowned boy was his own son. At the end of May 2019, he was diagnosed with PTSD for which, according to medical opinion, the 2015 incident was the precipitating cause. Effective May 30, 2019, Claimant was placed on sick leave. On August 5, 2019, he filed a petition for benefits (PFB) claiming entitlement to indemnity benefits under § 112.1815(5), Fla. Stat. The employer raised various defenses including late reporting and notice of claim.

JCC’s Decision

The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found that:

1. The 2015 drowning incident met the criteria of a qualifying event;
2. As a result of the qualifying event, Claimant suffers from PTSD;
3. The symptoms of PTSD manifested as of May 30, 2019; and
4. Claimant’s date of disablement from the PTSD was also May 30, 2019.

Using May 30, 2019 as the date of manifestation and the date of disablement as the applicable benchmark, the JCC found that Claimant timely filed notice of the injury under § 112.1815(5)(d), Fla. Stat. Using this same date, the JCC also found that the claim was timely “as it was filed within 52 weeks of the manifestation.”

The employer appealed. It did not challenge the JCC’s findings of fact or her determination that the notice of injury was timely. Instead, the employer argued that the JCC misinterpreted the statute when she found that the claim was timely noticed under § 112.1815(5)(d) based on the date of the PTSD manifestation

Appellate Court Decision

The appellate court noted that in analyzing a statutory provision, courts must first look to the plain language of the statute. The court stressed that here, § 112.1815(5)(d), Fla. Stat. plainly stated that a claim must be properly noticed within 52 weeks of the qualifying event. Based on the plain statutory language, the JCC erred when she found that the claim was timely because it was filed within 52 weeks of the date of the manifestation of Claimant’s PTSD symptoms.

Manifestation of PTSD Symptoms is Not a Qualifying Event

The court acknowledged Claimant’s contention that the JCC’s interpretation was correct because the PTSD manifestation itself was a qualifying event. The court noted, however, that § 112.1815(5)(a), Fla. Stat. listed only eleven very particular events that constitute qualifying events and the manifestation of PTSD symptoms was not among them. Moreover, indicated the court, the notice of injury requirement set forth in the first sentence of § 112.1815(5)(d), Fla. Stat. expressly distinguished between the occurrence of the qualifying event and that of the manifestation. The court concluded it made no sense to find that the Florida Legislature abandoned this unambiguous distinction in the very next sentence concerning the notice of claim requirement.

Statute of Repose, Not a Statute of Limitation

The court noted a significant difference between a statute of limitation (SOL) and a statute of repose. Although a SOL does not apply until a cause of action accrues, the same is not true for a statute of repose. Citing earlier precedents, the court noted also that although its effect might be to eliminate a cause of action before it accrues, a statute of repose is not unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection, due process, or access to courts.

The court found that the time requirement for a notice of claim under § 112.1815(5)(d), Fla. Stat. operated as a statute of repose, and not as a SOL. The Florida Legislature unambiguously chose the qualifying event date as the measuring point for filing a timely claim, and there was no evidence of any contrary legislative intent.

The court concluded that Claimant did not notice his claim within 52 weeks of the qualifying event, as required by the statute’s plain language. As a result, the JCC erred when she ruled that the claim was timely filed and awarded indemnity benefits. The JCC’s order was accordingly reversed.