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Jun 28, 2019

Maryland Home-Based Worker’s Fall Outside His Home Might Be Compensable

Yesterday, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in a case of first impression, adopted the three-part test for compensability of injuries to home-based employees described in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 16.10, and held that material facts remained in dispute as to whether the employee’s home qualified as a home work site and whether the employee had actually commenced his work day and was fulfilling work duties, or something incidental thereto, at the time of his injury. Accordingly, the judgment of a state trial court that had ruled the employee’s injuries were compensable as a matter of law was reversed and the case remanded for additional findings [Schwan Food Co. v. Frederick, 2019 Md. App. LEXIS 512 (June 27, 2019)].

Background

Ryan Frederick worked as a customer service representative for Schwan, a company based in Minnesota, with no local offices in Maryland. His job entailed traveling in his personal car to various grocery stores throughout Maryland to meet Schwan’s delivery drivers and receive inventory deliveries for each of his accounts. On the morning of January 28, 2016, while still at home, Frederick used his employer-provided handheld computer to download his route for the day. His plan was to drop his son off at daycare on the way to his first account, a Walmart store in Ellicott City. Unfortunately, Frederick slipped on black ice on the sidewalk by his car in front of his home and suffered injury to his right leg.

Commission’s Decision

Frederick sought workers’ compensation benefits, but Schwan and its insurer denied coverage, contending that at the time of the injury, Frederick had begun a personal errand—dropping his son off for daycare. The Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”) agreed with the insurer and denied Frederick’s claim, finding that he did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.

Circuit Court’s Jury Trial

Frederick sought review in the Circuit Court, requesting a jury trial. At the close of evidence, the court denied Schwan’s motion for judgment, but granted Frederick’s similar motion, finding—as a matter of law—that Frederick had been working from his “home office” before he set out to travel to his first account, and consequently, the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Appellate Court’s Decision

Initially, the appellate court noted that issue was one of first impression. The court observed that Schwan’s essential argument was that Frederick had not commenced his work day at his home and that he was not performing or discharging any actual duty related to that employment at the time of the injury. According to Schwan, Frederick was attempting to leave home in order to drop his son off at daycare. Frederick countered that he was injured during a time frame and at a location that his employer could reasonably expect him to be in the performance of his duties, that the purpose of his travel was work-related and that the mere fact that it was convenient to take his son to daycare, as he proceeded to his first assignment did not remove the incident from the course and scope of the employment.

Larson Three-Part Test

The court turned to Larson for guidance, citing and/or quoting it more than 30 times. The court observed that under the Larson test:

When reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at the end of the particular homeward trip, three principal indicia may be looked for: [1] the quantity and regularity of work performed at home; [2] the continuing presence of work equipment at home; and [3] special circumstances of the particular employment that make it necessary and not merely personally convenient to work at home [Larson § 16.10[2]].

The court noted that Maryland courts had “consistently quoted, with approval, Professor Larson’s discussions on various workers’ compensation issues and indicated that, in cases with somewhat similar facts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had utilized the Larson test [see Black River Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Resources, 207 N.W.2d 65 (Wisc. 1973)], as had an intermediate appellate court in New Jersey [see Manzo v. Amalgamated Indus. Union Local 76B, 575 A.2d 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)] and an appellate court in New York [see Hille v. Gerald Records, 242 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1968)].

Issues of Fact Remained

The court concluded that it could not say that the evidence permitted but one conclusion with regard to whether Frederick’s injury occurred in the course of the employment. The factual issues should have been decided by a jury. The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Frederick’s injury occurred in the course of his employment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.