Michigan Auditor’s Auto Accident Injury Claim Not Barred by Going and Coming Rule
Stressing that the Michigan Supreme Court’s Stark decision had not set forth four “factors” to be weighed in determining whether a claimant’s going and coming injury nevertheless occurred in the course and scope of the employment, but rather had enumerated four “exceptions” to the rule itself, a Michigan appellate court reversed a decision by the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission’s (MCAC) that had denied benefits to an auditor who sustained injuries in an automobile accident as he drove one morning from his home to one of the employer’s assembly plants to perform an audit [Smith v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 2020 Mich. App. LEXIS 1388 (Feb. 25, 2020)]. Quoting an earlier state court decision that, in turn, had quoted Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the court found that since both the magistrate and the MCAC had agreed that the auditor had been on a special mission at the time of the accident, his injuries were compensable. Meeting one or more of the Stark “exceptions” was sufficient.
Background
Following the auto accident, the auditor sought workers’ compensation benefits. The employer contended, however, that the auditor had merely been injured while traveling to work, which is not compensable under Michigan’s Workers’ Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. Following a hearing, the magistrate found the auditor’s injuries had occurred in the course and scope of the employment. The magistrate noted that the auditor had been driving his own personal vehicle at the time, but was paid for the mileage driven to the remote facility. The magistrate added that the auditor was transporting his company-owned computer and cell phone as well as necessary papers that he had taken home the previous day. The magistrate also noted that the auditor had no fixed hours of work and was paid an annual salary not based upon the number of hours he worked.
MCAC Reverses Magistrate’s Decision
The MCAC reversed, finding that the auditor had failed to establish three of the four exceptions identified in Stark v L. E. Myers Co., 58 Mich App 439, 228 NW2d 411 (1975). The auditor appealed.
Stark Enumerates “Exceptions,” Not “Factors”
The appellate court indicated that both the magistrate and the MCAC appeared to consider the “exceptions” to the general going and coming rule as elements of a balancing test. In doing so, they had misconstrued the law. The court said Stark, as well as prior and subsequent Michigan caselaw, should be read as establishing “exceptions” to the general rule — not “factors” — and that each of those exceptions was independent of the others.
The court acknowledged that some of the confusion might stem from the court’s own opinion in Forgach v. George Koch & Sons Co., 167 Mich App 50, 421 NW2d 568 (1988). It reiterated, however, that there was no balancing test; each of the exceptions should be viewed on its own. The court noted that the MCAC itself said one of the four Stark exceptions applied — the special mission exception — but nevertheless reversed the magistrate’s decision because it concluded, in an apparent balancing test, that the other three exceptions did not apply. That was error.
Quoting Bowman v. R. L. Coolsaet Constr. Co. (On Remand), 275 Mich App 188, 191, 738 NW2d 260 (2007) , which, in turn had quoted Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the court stressed that here, the auditor’s job was to travel to various employer facilities to perform his work. The travel, therefore, was an integral part of his duties and, as a result, the accident occurred during the course and scope of the employment. The court added that the auditor’s claim was buttressed by the fact that he was reimbursed for the expenses of the travel. For the auditor, two exceptions applied and the MCAC was in error when it tried to weigh those exceptions against other factors.